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Abstract—We consider a network of two nodes separated by
a noisy channel, in which the source and its reconstruction have
to be strongly coordinated, while simultaneously satisfying the
strong secrecy condition with respect to an outside observer of the
noisy channel. In the case of non-causal encoding and decoding,
we propose a joint source-channel coding scheme for the secure
strong coordination region. Furthermore, we provide a complete
characterization of the secure strong coordination region when
the decoder has to reliably reconstruct the source sequence and
the legitimate channel is more capable than the channel of the
eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic security and privacy has been an active
field of research for decades, with increased activity over
the past 10–15 years [1]. More recently, information-theoretic
notions and tools have been applied also to related problems
in decision and control [2] and learning [3]. This motivates
research on new results in the information-theoretic core that
are valid beyond traditional transmission and storage of in-
formation. Coordination was introduced in [4] as one such
generalization of traditional information exchange problems,
with application in scenarios where action needs to be taken
to align statistical information over a network. However, so far
there are relatively few results on coordination with security
constraints, with the exception of [5], [6] that looked at secure
coordination with noiseless links.
In particular, [5] considers the weaker metric of empirical
coordination, which requires the joint histogram of the actions
in the network to be close with high probability to a desired
distribution. While empirical coordination is only interested
in controlling the joint histogram, strong coordination deals
instead with the joint probability distribution of the actions.
Whenever the average behavior over time is the concern,
looking at the empirical joint distribution is enough. On the
other hand, if an adversary is involved, a sequence of strongly
coordinated actions appears truly random to an outside ob-
server. In [6], the authors consider strong coordination for the
case of noiseless links and an eavesdropper that receives the
same message as the legitimate receiver. However, since real-
life communication is noisy, the assumption of an error-free
link between the agents as in [5], [6] should be revisited.
In this paper, we study the problem of secure strong coor-
dination through a noisy channel and in the presence of an
eavesdropper, as depicted in Fig. 1. More precisely, we study a
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Figure 1. System model. Eve observes the channel realization Zn but is
oblivious of the common randomness C.
three-node network model comprised of an information source
and a noisy channel, in which two agents, an encoder and
a decoder, have access to a common source of randomness.
Moreover, we consider an eavesdropper that observes an output
of the noisy channel (possibly different from the decoder’s) but
has no knowledge of the common randomness. This scenario
presents two different goals: the encoder needs to convey a
message to the decoder to strongly coordinate the reconstructed
version of the source, while simultaneously ensuring that the
eavesdropper is completely oblivious of the source and its
reconstruction.
We derive an inner bound for the secure strong coordination
region by developing a joint source-channel scheme in which
we introduce an auxiliary codebook that allows us to satisfy
both requests. Although the region is still unknown in the
general case, we are able to characterize the region when
the decoder reliably reconstructs the source and the legitimate
channel is more capable than the eavesdropper’s channel.
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the notation and some preliminary results, while
Section III describes the model under investigation, states the
main results, and compares the obtained original results with
previous works. Finally, the proofs of the main results are found
in Section IV.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We define the integer interval Ja, bK as the set of integers
between a and b. Given a random vector Xn := (X1, . . . , Xn),
we denote Xi as the first i components of Xn, and X∼i
as the vector (Xj)j 6=i, j ∈ J1, nK, i.e., Xn without the
component Xi. We use V(·, ·) and D(·‖·) to denote the total
variation distance (or variational distance) and the Kullback–
Leibler divergence between two distributions, respectively. The
notation f(ε) denotes a function which tends to zero as ε does,
and the notation δ(n) denotes a function which tends to zero
exponentially as n goes to infinity.
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We now state without proof some results that we need later.
Lemma 1 (Properties of the total variation distance):
(i) V(PA, PˆA) ≤ V(PAB , PˆAB), see [4, Lemma 16];
(ii) V(PA, PˆA) = V(PAPB|A, PˆAPB|A), see [4, Lemma 17];
(iii) if V(PAPB|A, P ′AP ′B|A) = ε, then there exists a ∈ A such
that V(PB|A=a, P ′B|A=a) ≤ 2ε, see [7, Lemma 4].
Lemma 2 (Coloring lemma [8, Lemma 1]): Given a pair of
random variables (A,B) ∈ A×B with joint distribution PAB ,
marginals PA and PB , and |A| ≥ 4, we have that
V(PAB , PAPB)2
2 log 2
≤ I(A;B)
≤ V(PAB , PAPB) log |A|V(PAB , PAPB) ,
where the left-hand side is Pinsker’s inequality.
Lemma 3 ([9, Lemma 5]): Let P¯⊗nA denote the i.i.d. product
distribution associated with P¯A, and let PAn be such that
V(PAn , P¯⊗nA ) ≤ ε. Then, we have that∑n
t=1
I(At;A∼t) ≤ n f(ε),
for some function f() where limx→0 f(x) = 0. In particular,
if PAB is such that V(PAB , P¯AP¯B) ≤ ε, then I(A;B) ≤ f(ε).
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
A. System Model
Consider the setting of Fig. 1, where a user observes an i.i.d.
source Un, with distribution P¯U , and wishes to coordinate the
actions of another user with Un by communicating through
a discrete memoryless channel P¯Y Z|X . The communication is
overheard by an eavesdropper, and thus the coordination must
be achieved without leaking any information.
In this setting, coordination implies that the pair of sequences
(Un, V n) appears to be randomly drawn from the product
distribution P¯⊗nUV . The two legitimate users, an encoder and a
decoder, share a source of common randomness C ∈ J1, 2nR0K,
which is independent of the source Un, to facilitate said
coordination. The common randomness, C, may be thought of
as being a secret key, shared between the legitimate users but
unknown to the eavesdropper. Therefore, it helps the encoder
and the decoder coordinate their actions at the same time that
allows secrecy. As with a secret key, the legitimate users can
obtain the common randomness from shared resources [10].
The coordination scheme is as follows. First, the encoder
selects a signal Xn = fn(Un, C), fn : Un × J1, 2nR0K→ Xn,
which is transmitted over the channel P¯Y Z|X symbol by sym-
bol. Then, using the channel observation Y n and the common
randomness C, the decoder selects an action V n = gn(Y n, C),
gn : Yn×J1, 2nR0K→ Vn. On the other hand, the eavesdropper
observes the signal Zn but has no access to the common
randomness C. For block length n, the pair (fn, gn) constitutes
a coordination code.
We want to understand the interplay between the strong
coordination of the actions and secrecy: the induced joint distri-
bution PUnV nZn has to satisfy the strong secrecy condition [11]
while strongly coordinating (Un, V n). We define the secure
strong coordination region as in [12, Definition 4.17].
Definition 1 (Secure strong coordination): For a source P¯U
and a channel P¯Y Z|X , a pair (P¯V |U , R0) is achievable for
secure strong coordination if there exists a sequence (fn, gn) of
encoders-decoders with rate of common randomness R0, such
that
lim
n→∞V
(
PUnV n , P¯
⊗n
UV
)
= 0, (1)
lim
n→∞D(PUnV nZn‖PUnV nPZn)= limn→∞ I(U
nV n;Zn)=0, (2)
where PUnXnY nZnV n is the joint distribution induced by the
source, the channel, and the coordination code. The secure
strong coordination region S is the closure of the set of all
achievable pairs (P¯V |U , R0).
Remark 1: In the definition above, the first condition corre-
sponds of strong coordination of U and V , and the second one
is the strong secrecy condition.
B. Main Results
1) General Case: For the setting of Fig. 1, the secure strong
coordination region is still unknown. However, we provide here
an inner bound for the region S .
Theorem 1: Let P¯U and P¯Y Z|X be the given source and
channel parameters, then Sin ⊆ S, where
Sin :=
⋃
P¯W2X

(P¯V |U , R0) :
∃W1∈ W1,W1 ∼ P¯W1|UV s.t.
P¯UW1V = P¯U P¯W1|U P¯V |W1
I(W1;U) ≤ I(W2;Y )
R0 ≥ I(UV ;W1)
−[I(W2;Y )− I(W2;Z)]
|W1| ≤ |U × V|+ 1

, (3)
and the union is with respect to all auxiliary random variables
W2∈ W2 such that |W2| ≤ |X |+ 1.
Proof: The proof is deferred to Section IV-A.
In general, the region Sin is not tight due to the constraint
related to the transmission of the auxiliary random variable
W1 through the channel, i.e., I(W1;U) ≤ I(W2;Y ). A similar
issue is also encountered in [13], albeit for the problem of
secret key generation. Nonetheless, we are able to characterize
the region S in some cases, as we see next.
Remark 2: Observe that we use two random variables in this
proof. Similarly to [14], this is due to the double purpose of
the problem as in: coordinate the actions U and V , and make
their joint distribution independent from the observation of an
eavesdropper.
2) More Capable Channel and Reliable Source Reconstruc-
tion: Suppose that the decoder wants to reconstruct the source
reliably, i.e., P{Un 6= V n} ≤ f(ε), and that the legitimate
decoder’s channel is more capable than the eavesdropper’s,
i.e., I(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Z) for all P¯X ; then, the following result
characterizes the secure strong coordination region.
Corollary 1: If the decoder has a more capable channel
than the eavesdropper and reconstructs the source reliably, the
secure strong coordination region is
S :=
⋃
P¯X

(P¯V |U , R0) :
∃W ∈ W,W ∼ P¯W |UV s.t.
P¯UWV = P¯U P¯W |U P¯V |W
I(W ;U) ≤ I(X;Y )
R0 ≥ I(UV ;W )
−[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]
|W| ≤ |U × V|+ 1

. (4)
Proof: The proof is deferred to Section IV-B.
Remark 3: We note that in the more capable case, as here,
CS := maxP¯X
[
I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z)] is the secrecy capacity
of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel [11, Thm. 22.1].
If we further assume all the channels to be symmetric, the
uniform distribution P¯X(x) = 1/|X |, ∀x ∈ X , maximizes
the mutual information I(X;Y ) as well as the difference
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z).
The previous remark shows that, in our setting, the rate of
common randomness is reduced by the presence of a secure
channel. Instead of relying only on the common randomness C
for coordination, the encoder may generate random bits locally
and transmit them securely to the decoder over the wiretap
channel.
C. Comparison with Previous Results
In [12], the authors consider a two-node network, comprised
of an information source and a noisy channel, and study
the secure strong coordination problem of an eavesdropper
that receives the same sequence Y n as the decoder but has
no knowledge of the common randomness C. Note that the
capacity result in [12, Thm. 4.15] presents the same rate
constraints of Corollary 1 if we specialize the latter to the case
Y = Z. However, since in the assumption of Corollary 1 we ask
for reliable reconstruction of the source, the set of achievable
target distributions is different.
For noiseless channels, a similar problem has been con-
sidered in [6], which analyzes a three-node cascade network,
comprised of an i.i.d. source, two noiseless links, and a source
of common randomness. Note that the problem of finding
the strong coordination region for the cascade setting is still
open, but under the secrecy constraint that the source and
the nodes’ actions are independent of the messages exchanged
via the noiseless links, [6, Thm. 1] characterizes the secure
strong coordination region. Similarly to [12, Thm. 4.15], we
observe that by modifying Corollary 1 with Z = Y , W = U ,
V = Y , U = X , and I(X;Y ) = R1, we recover the same rate
conditions as in the special case of [6, Thm. 1] of a cascade
without the third node.
Observe that, in both [12] and [6], a capacity region is
derived when the eavesdropper observes the same sequence
as the legitimate receiver, but without access to the common
randomness. With respect to the general case, [12, Prop. 4.18]
is a first attempt to provide an inner bound for the secure strong
coordination region. In this paper, we present a more general
achievability, as well as a converse for a special case.
IV. PROOFS
In this part, we prove the inner bound for the secure strong
coordination region in the general setting of Section III-B1 and
the secure strong coordination region for the special setting of
Section III-B2.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let P¯W2X be a distribution on W2 ×X , and let Sin(P¯W2X)
be the region defined by the expression in curly braces on the
r.h.s. of (3). In the sequel, we prove that for every P¯W2X the
region Sin(P¯W2X) is achievable.
1) Strong coordination of (Un,Wn, Xn, Y n, Zn, V n): We
introduce an auxiliary random variable W taking values in W
such that
P¯UWXY ZV = P¯U P¯W |U P¯X|UW P¯Y Z|X P¯V |WY , (5)
where P¯X|UW is a target i.i.d. conditional distribution. The
connection between P¯W |U P¯X|UW in (5) and P¯W1|U P¯W2X in
the inner bound (3) will be made clear at the end of the proof.
Suppose that in the setting of Fig. 1, both the encoder and
the decoder have access not only to the common randomness
C but also to an extra randomness F , where C is generated
uniformly at random in J1, 2nR0K with distribution QC and F is
generated uniformly at random in J1, 2nRK with distribution QF
and independently of C. Note that if we consider the marginal
P¯UWXY V of (5) with respect to (Un,Wn, Xn, Y n, V n), [9,
Thm. 1] proposes an achievable strong coordination scheme.
The key idea is to consider two uniform (and independent)
random binnings for Wn:
1) binning C = ϕ1(Wn), where ϕ1 :Wn → J1, 2nR0K maps
each sequence of Wn uniformly and independently to the
set J1, 2nR0K;
2) binning F = ϕ2(Wn), where ϕ2 : Wn → J1, 2nRK maps
each sequence of Wn uniformly and independently to the
set J1, 2nRK.
Then, a random binning and random coding schemes are
presented, each of which induces a joint distribution, which
we denote PRB and PRC, respectively:
PRB := P¯Un P¯Wn|Un P¯Xn|WnUn P¯C|Wn P¯F |Wn
P¯Y n|Xn P¯V n|WnY nP SWWˆn|CFY n , (6a)
PRC := QCQF P¯Un P¯Wn|CFUn P¯Xn|WnUn
P¯Y n|XnP SWWˆn|CFY n P¯V n|WˆnY n , (6b)
where we added Wˆn, i.e., the output of the Slepian–Wolf
decoder P SW
Wˆn|CFY n .
It is shown in [9] that the distribution PRB is trivially close
in total variation distance to the target distribution P¯⊗nUWXY V .
Moreover, because of the properties of random binning, if
H(W |Y ) < R + R0 < H(W |U), the random binning and
the random coding schemes have the same statistics, and thus
PRC is close in total variation distance to the target P¯⊗nUWXY V .
Now we observe that coordinating Zn as well as (Un,Wn,
Xn, Y n, V n) does not require more common randomness:
V
(
PRB
UnXnWnWˆnY nZnV nCF
, PRC
UnXnWnWˆnY nZnV nCF
)
(a)
= V
(
PRBPZn|XnY n , PRCPZn|XnY n
)
(b)
= V
(
PRB, PRC
)
= δ(n), (7)
where (a) follows from the chain rule and the definitions of
PRB and PRC in (6); and, (b) is due to (ii) in Lemma 1.
2) Reducing the rate of common randomness—Strong coor-
dination of (Un, Zn, V n): We note that even though the extra
common randomness F is required to coordinate (Un,Wn,
Xn, Y n, Zn, V n), we do not need it in order to coordinate only
(Un, Zn, V n). Observe that by (i) in Lemma 1, equation (7)
implies that
V(PRBUnXnY nZnV nF , PRCUnXnY nZnV nF ) = δ(n), (8)
and thus
V(PRBUnZnV nF , PRCUnZnV nF ) = δ(n). (9)
Similarly to [7], we reduce the rate of common randomness
by having the two nodes agree on F = f , using randomness
extraction techiniques (see for instance [15, Chapter 17]). To
do so, we recall the following result, inspired by the discussion
in [16, Section III.A], and proved in this slightly different
formulation in [12, Lemma 2.20].
Lemma 4 (Channel randomness extraction for discrete mem-
oryless sources and channels): Let An, distributed according
to PAn , be a DMS and PBn|An , a DMC. Moreover, let
ϕn : Bn → J1, 2nRK be a uniform random binning of Bn, and
K := ϕn(B
n). Then, if R ≤ H(B|A), there exists a constant
α > 0 such that
Eϕn
[
D(PAnK‖PAnQK)
] ≤ 2−αn, (10)
where QK is the uniform distribution on J1, 2nRK.
We now apply Lemma 4 to the variables Bn = Wn, K = F ,
and An = (Un, Zn, V n). Thus, if R < H(W |UZV ), there
exists a fixed binning (see [1, Lemma 2.2]) such that
V(PRBUnZnV nF , QFPRBUnZnV n) = δ(n). (11)
Combining (9) and (11), with the help of the triangle inequality,
we have that
V(QFPRBUnZnV n , PRCUnZnV nF ) = δ(n). (12)
Note that PRCUnZnV nF = QFP
RC
UnZnV n|F according to the
definition of PRC. Then, by (iii) in Lemma 1, (12) implies
that there exists f ∈ J1, 2nRK such that
V(PRBUnZnV n|F=f , P
RC
UnZnV n|F=f ) = δ(n). (13)
Therefore, by fixing F = f and using common randomness C,
we have strong coordination for (Un, Zn, V n).
3) Rate constraints: The preceding achievable scheme has
imposed the following rate constraints:
H(W |Y ) < R+R0 < H(W |U),
R < H(W |UZV ).
Therefore, we obtain:
R0 > H(W |Y )−H(W |UZV ),
I(W ;U) < I(W ;Y ).
4) Achieving secrecy—Independence between source and
channel variables: We now consider the case where the random
variables of the channel are independent from the random
variables of the source, i.e., W = (W1,W2) and (U,W1, V )
independent of (W2, X, Y, Z). Since
H(W |Y )−H(W |UZV )
= H(W1W2|Y )−H(W1W2|UZV )
= I(W1W2;UZV )− I(W1W2;Y )
= I(W1;UV ) + I(W2;Z)− I(W2;Y ),
the target distribution and information constraints become:
P¯U P¯W1|U P¯V |W1 P¯W2 P¯X|W2 P¯Y Z|X ,
I(W1;U) < I(W2;Y ),
R0 > I(W1;UV ) + I(W2;Z)− I(W2;Y ).
Observe that in this setting, marginalizing over the un-
coordinated variables, the target distribution is of the form
P¯⊗nUV P¯
⊗n
Z . Therefore achieving strong coordination of the
sequences (Un, Zn, V n) means that V
(
P¯⊗nUV P¯
⊗n
Z , P
RC
UnV nZn
)
vanishes. By the upper bound on the mutual information in
Lemma 2, the strong secrecy condition (2) is verified since there
exists a sequence of codes such that V
(
P¯⊗nUV P¯
⊗n
Z , P
RC
UnV nZn
)
goes to zero exponentially. Moreover, strong coordination of
(Un, Zn, V n) implies (1).
To conclude the proof of achievability, we note that only
a part of the auxiliary random variable W , i.e., W1, is used
to coordinate the actions. The other part, W2, is used to
(implicitly) create a wiretap code for the channel. Hence, for
every fixed P¯W2X we have proved that the region Sin(P¯W2X)
is achievable for secure strong coordination.
Remark 4 (Exponential speed of convergence): The proof of
the convergence in total variation distance relies on Lemmas 1
and 4. By Lemma 4, the Kullback–Leibler divergence goes to
zero exponentially, and so does the total variation distance (see
the r.h.s. of Lemma 2). On the other hand, the properties of the
total variation distance metric in Lemma 1 do not modify the
speed of convergence.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
1) Achievability: The achievability follows from the general
inner bound Sin, with W2 = X and W1 = W .
2) Converse: According to the system model described in
Section III-A, let C be a source of common randomness
accessible to both the encoder and the decoder, and uniformly
distributed in J1, 2nR0K, for a sufficiently large n. Consider a
code (fn, gn) that induces a distribution PUnV n on the actions
that is ε-close in total variation distance to the i.i.d. distribution
P¯⊗nUV and such that I(U
nV n;Zn) ≤ f(ε). Furthermore, let the
random variable T be uniformly distributed over the set J1, nK
and independent of the variables (Un, Xn, Y n, Zn, V n, C).
First, to obtain the bound on the information constraint,
observe that
0
(a)
≤ I(Xn;Y n)− I(Y n;UnC)
≤ I(Xn;Y n)− I(Y n;Un|C)
(b)
≤ n I(X;Y )−
∑n
t=1
I(Y n;Ut|U t−1C)
= n I(X;Y )−
∑
t
[
I(Y nU t−1C;Ut)− I(U t−1C;Ut)
]
(c)
= n I(X;Y )−
∑
t
I(Y nU t−1C;Ut)
≤ n I(X;Y )−
∑
t
I(Y nC;Ut)
(d)
= n
[
I(X;Y )− I(WT ;UT |T )
]
= n
[
I(X;Y )− I(WTT ;UT ) + I(T ;UT )
]
(e)
= n
[
I(X;Y )− I(W ;U)], (14)
where (a) follows from the Markov chain (Un, C) − Xn −
Y n; (b) is due to the channel P¯Y |X being memoryless; (c)
and (e) follow from the i.i.d. nature of the source P¯U and
the independence of the source from the common randomness;
and, (d) and (e) follow from identifying the auxiliary random
variables Wt := (C, Y n) for each t ∈ J1, nK and introducing
the time-sharing random variable T , and W := (WT , T ) =
(C, Y n, T ).
For the source of common randomness, we have that
nR0 = H(C)
≥ H(C|Y n)−H(C|Y nUnV n)
= I(UnV n;C|Y n)
= I(UnV n;CY n)− I(UnV n;Y n)
(f)
≥ I(UnV n;CY n)− I(UnV n;Y n)
+ I(UnV n;Zn)− f(ε), (15)
where (f) comes from the secrecy condition. Now, the first
term on the r.h.s. of (15) may be bounded as follows
I(UnV n;CY n)
=
∑n
t=1
I(UtVt;CY
n|U t−1V t−1)
=
∑
t
[
I(UtVt;CY
nU t−1V t−1)− I(UtVt;U t−1V t−1)
]
(g)
≥
∑
t
I(UtVt;CY
nU t−1V t−1)− nf(ε)
≥
∑
t
I(UtVt;CY
n)− nf(ε)
(h)
= n I(UTVT ;WT |T )− nf(ε)
= n
[
I(UTVT ;WTT )− I(UTVT ;T )
]− nf(ε)
(i)
≥ n I(UTVT ;WTT )− 2nf(ε)
(j)
= n I(UV ;W )− 2nf(ε), (16)
where (g) and (i) are due to Lemma 3 and [17, Lemma
VI.3], respectively, since the induced distribution PUnV n is
close to i.i.d. by hypothesis; (h) stems from the definition
of the auxiliary random variable Wt for each t ∈ J1, nK
and the introduction of the time-sharing random variable T ;
and, (j) follows from defining U := UT , V := VT , and
W := (WT , T ) = (C, Y
n, T ).
For the remaining terms on the r.h.s. of (15), consider
I(UnV n;Y n)− I(UnV n;Zn)
≤ I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Zn) + I(V n;Y n|Un)
≤ I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Zn) +H(V n|Un)
(k)
≤ I(Un;Y n)− I(Un;Zn) + nf(ε)
=
n∑
t=1
[
I(Un;Yt|Y t−1)− I(Un;Zt|Znt+1)
]
+ nf(ε)
(l)
=
∑
t
[
I(UnZnt+1;Yt|Y t−1)
− I(UnY t−1;Zt|Znt+1)
]
+ nf(ε)
(m)
=
∑
t
[
I(Un;Yt|Y t−1Znt+1)
− I(Un;Zt|Y t−1Znt+1)
]
+ nf(ε)
(n)
=
∑
t
[
I(W2,t;Yt|W3,t)− I(W2,t;Zt|W3,t)
]
+ nf(ε)
(o)
= n
[
I(W2;YT |W3)− I(W2;ZT |W3)
]
+ nf(ε)
≤ nmax
i
[
I(W2;YT |W3 = i)− I(W2;ZT |W3 = i)
]
+ nf(ε)
(p)
= n
[
I(W˜2;Y )− I(W˜2;Z)
]
+ nf(ε)
(q)
≤ n[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]+ nf(ε), (17)
where (k) is due to Fano’s inequality [18] and the assumption
of reliable source reconstruction; (l) and (m) stem from the
Csisza´r sum identity [11]; (n) and (o) follow from identi-
fying the auxiliary random variables W3,t := (Y t−1, Znt+1),
W3 := (W3,T , T ) = (Y
T−1, ZnT+1, T ), W2,t := (U
n,W3,t),
and W2 := (W2,T , T ) = (Un,W3); and, (p) follows from
defining Y := YT , Z := ZT , and W˜2 ∼ PW2|W3=i? (where
i? is the value that maximizes the bound), and the Markov
chain W˜2 − X − (Y,Z); this last step is possible since W˜2
does not appear in any other bound. Finally, (q) is due to the
more capable assumption. Combining (15)–(17), we obtain the
bound on the rate of the source of common randomness.
Similarly to [17], the cardinality bound on W is a conse-
quence of the Fenchel–Eggleston–Carathe´odory’s theorem [11,
Appendix C]; and the proof is omitted.
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